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This paper estimates a time-varying AR-GARCH model of inflation producing measures of 
inflation uncertainty for the euro area, and investigates the linkages between them in a VAR 
framework, also allowing for the possible impact of the policy regime change associated with 
the start of EMU in 1999. The main findings are as follows. Steady-state inflation and 
inflation uncertainty have declined steadily since the inception of EMU, whilst short-run 
uncertainty has increased, mainly owing to exogenous shocks. A sequential dummy procedure 
provides further evidence of a structural break coinciding with the introduction of the euro 
and resulting in lower long-run uncertainty. It also appears that the direction of causality has 
been reversed, and that in the euro period the Friedman-Ball link is empirically supported, 
implying that the ECB can achieve lower inflation uncertainty by lowering the inflation rate. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Inflation uncertainty, its linkages with actual inflation and its potential impact on real 
economic activity have been extensively analysed in the literature. Friedman (1977) 
was the first to suggest that higher average inflation could result in higher inflation 
uncertainty. This idea was developed by Ball (1992) in the context of a model in 
which higher inflation leads to increasing uncertainty over the monetary policy stance. 
The possibility of a negative effect of inflation on its uncertainty was then considered 
by Pourgerami and Maskus (1987), who pointed out that in an environment of 
accelerating inflation agents may invest more resources in inflation forecasting, thus 
reducing uncertainty (see also Ungar and Zilberfarb, 1993). Causality in the opposite 
direction, namely from inflation uncertainty to inflation, is instead a property of 
models based on the Barro–Gordon setup, such as the one due to Cukierman and 
Meltzer (1986).  
 
Concerning the relationship between inflation uncertainty and real economic activity, 
some authors suggest that the former reduces the rate of investment by hindering 
long-term contracts (see, e.g., Fischer and Modigliani, 1978), or by increasing the 
option value of delaying an irreversible investment (see, e.g., Pindyck, 1991). Others 
argue that, to the extent that it is associated with increased relative price variation, it 
reduces the allocational efficiency of the price system  (see Friedman, 1977). In 
contrast, Dotsey and Sarte (2000) show that inflation variability may increase 
investment through its impact on precautionary savings. Finally, Cecchetti (1993) 
suggests that a general equilibrium, representative agent model is not likely to yield a 
convincingly unambiguous result on the impact of uncertainty on real economic 
activity.  
 
On the empirical side, a number of studies have investigated the relationship between 
inflation and inflation uncertainty, typically adopting an econometric framework of 
the GARCH type (see Engle, 1982), and providing mixed evidence (see Davis and 
Kanago, 2000 for a survey, and Baillie et al., 1996, Brunner and Hess 1993, 
Kontonikas 2004, Grier and Perry, 2000 for some specific contributions). Other 
authors take instead a VAR approach to analyse US data. In particular, Benati and 
Surico (2008) estimate structural VARs with time-varying parameters and stochastic 
volatility and report a decline in inflation predictability, showing that this can be 
caused by tough anti-inflation policies in the context of a sticky price model. Cogley 
et al. (2009) take a similar approach but focus instead on the inflation gap, and 
present evidence that this started decreasing in the early 1980s, when the inflation rate 
was reduced, and kept falling when Greenspan took over the chairmanship of the Fed. 
This result is then rationalised in terms of a new Keynesian DSGE model, within 
which a more stable long-run inflation target is the main factor leading to lower 
inflation volatility and persistence. 
 
Empirical studies on the linkages between inflation uncertainty and real economic 
activity also report conflicting results both in terms of the sign (see, e.g., Holland,  
1993) and of the magnitude and timing of the effects (see, e.g., Davis and Kanago, 
1996, Cunningham, Tang, and Vilasuso, 1997, and Grier and Perry, 2000). Elder 
(2004) finds that in the US inflation uncertainty has significantly reduced real 
economic activity. This holds for the period prior to 1979, after 1982, and over the   2
full post-1966 period and is robust to various specifications. This result is obtained by 
combining a VAR specification with a multivariate GARCH model. 
 
The present study aims to contribute to this area of the literature by estimating a time-
varying AR-GARCH model of inflation producing measures of inflation uncertainty 
for the euro area, and investigating the linkages between them in a VAR framework, 
also allowing for the possible impact of the policy regime change associated with the 
start of EMU in 1999. Among recent studies, O’Really and Whelan (2005) focus on 
inflation persistence and find relatively little instability in the parameters of the euro-
area inflation process. Full-sample estimates of the persistence parameter are 
generally close to 1, and the hypothesis that this parameter has been stable over time 
cannot be rejected. Angeloni et al. (2006), using micro data on consumer prices and 
sectoral inflation rates from six euro-area countries spanning several years before and 
after the introduction of the euro, find no evidence of a shift around 1999. Finally, 
Altissimo et al. (2006) note that, for aggregate data, the degree of inflation persistence 
in the euro area appears to be very high for sample periods spanning multiple decades 
but falls dramatically once time variation in the mean level of inflation is allowed for; 
furthermore, the timing of the breaks generally coincides with observed shifts in the 
monetary policy regime.  
The choice of focusing in the present study on the Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP) for the euro area as a whole reflects the ECB’s mandate to achieve 
aggregate price stability in the Eurozone, the absence of instruments to fine-tune 
monetary policy to cyclical fluctuations in individual EMU countries, and  the 
recognition that inflation differentials play a secondary role when calibrating the 
safety margin for admissible inflation in the euro area (ECB, 2003). The availability 
of reliable and easy-to-update measures of inflation uncertainty is particularly relevant 
for monetary policy purposes (Goodhart, 1999, and Greenspan, 2003). As Soderstrom 
(2002) notes, when there is uncertainty about the persistence of inflation, it is optimal 
for the central bank to respond more aggressively to shocks than when the parameters 
are known with certainty, in order to avoid undesirable outcomes in the future. 
According to Shuetrim and Thomson (2003), for certain shocks, taking into account 
parameter uncertainty can imply that a more, rather than less, activist use of the policy 
instrument is appropriate. While this finding is specific to their model specification, 
parameter estimates and shocks analysed, it contrasts with the widely held belief that 
the general implication of parameter uncertainty is a more conservative policy. 
Finally, Coenen (2007) argues that a cautious monetary policy-maker is well-advised 
to design and implement interest-rate policies under the assumption that inflation 
persistence is high when there is considerable uncertainty about its degree. Such 
policies are characterised by a relatively aggressive response to inflation 
developments and exhibit a substantial degree of inertia. 
Surprisingly, studies on the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty 
for the euro area as a whole are distinctly rare. Most of them are either based on 
survey data (see, e.g., Giordani and Söderlind, 2003, and Arnold and Lemmen, 2008) 
or adopt a country-by-country approach (see Fountas et al. 2004, and Apergis, 2004). 
Our econometric framework is similar to that originally proposed by Evans (1991) 
and recently used by Berument et al. (2005) and Caporale and Kontonikas (2009). 
The latter authors analyse inflation uncertainty and its relation with inflation at 
country level in twelve EMU member states, and report that there is considerable   3
heterogeneity across countries, even after the introduction of the euro, and also that 
the Friedman-Ball link appears to have weakened or even broken down in a number 
of cases in individual member states after the creation of EMU. 
Our analysis extends theirs in several ways. First, as already mentioned, we focus on 
the euro area as a whole, consistently with the ECB’s mandate. Second, we model 
inflation as a function of the unemployment rate rather than past inflation only, thus 
establishing a link between the present study and the literature on the Phillips curve in 
Europe. Third, we investigate empirically the relationship between inflation 
uncertainty and inflation in a bivariate VAR framework instead of a single-equation 
model.  
More specifically, we take a two-step approach as in Grier and Perry (1998) and 
Caporale and Kontonikas (2009), namely we first estimate AR-GARCH models with 
time-varying parameters to generate a measure of inflation uncertainty, and then 
estimate the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty in a bivariate 
VAR context. The model we use in the first step regresses current inflation on lagged 
inflation and lagged unemployment. The advantages in terms of forecast accuracy 
deriving from including the unemployment rate as a measure of real economic activity 
in a model for inflation are discussed by Stock and Watson (1999) and Amisano and 
Giacomini (2007).  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the methodology. Section 3 
describes the data and the empirical results. Section 4 offers some concluding 
remarks, highlighting in particular the policy implications of our findings. 
 
2. Econometric  Framework 
 
The GARCH models typically used in the literature have the drawback that they do 
not take into account the fact that short-run and long-run inflation uncertainty might 
be very different and affect inflation expectations in different ways.  
 
As emphasised by Evans (1991), agents’ temporal decisions are more likely to be 
affected by the conditional variance of short-run movements in inflation, whilst 
intertemporal decisions might be based mainly on changes in the conditional variance 
of long-term inflation. Moreover, one should distinguish between “structural 
uncertainty” (associated with the randomness in the time-varying parameters of the 
inflation process, and representing the propagation mechanism), which might 
originate, for instance, from unanticipated monetary policy changes, and “impulse 
uncertainty” (associated with the shocks hitting the conditional variance, which are 
propagated through the parameters of the inflation process).~ 
 
The econometric framework suggested by Evans (1991), and also used by Berument 
et al. (2005) and Caporale and Kontonikas (2009), has the advantage of yielding 
estimates of the various types of uncertainty discussed above, and is adopted here as 
well. More specifically, inflation is specified as a k-th order autoregressive process, 
AR(k), and is also a function of unemployment, the parameters being time-varying 
and the residuals following a GARCH(1,1) process. The model is the following: 
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where  πt+1 denotes the rate of inflation between t and t+1;  Xt is a vector of 
explanatory variables known at time t containing current and lagged values of 
inflation and the unemployment rate ut;  et+1 describes the shocks to the inflation 
process that cannot be forecast with information known at time t, and is assumed to be 
normally distributed with a time-varying conditional variance ht. The conditional 
variance is specified as a GARCH(p,q) process, that is, as a linear function of past 
squared forecast errors, e
2
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π π π  denotes the time-varying parameter 
vector, and Vt+1 is a vector of shocks to βt+1, assumed to be normally distributed with 
a homoscedastic covariance matrix Q. The updating equations for the Kalman filter 
are: 
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where  t+1t Ω  is the conditional covariance matrix of  t+1 β  given the information set at 
time t, representing uncertainty about the structure of the inflation process.  
 
As Equation (5) indicates, the conditional variance of inflation (short-run uncertainty), 
Ht, can be decomposed into: (i) the uncertainty due to randomness in the inflation 
shocks et+1, measured by their conditional volatility ht (impulse uncertainty); (ii) the 
uncertainty due to unanticipated changes in the structure of inflation Vt+1, measured 
by the conditional variance of  tt + 1 X β , which is 
'
t S = tt t+1t X Ω X  (structural 
uncertainty). The standard GARCH model can be obtained as a special case of this 
model if there is no uncertainty about  t+1 β , so that  = t+1t Ω 0.  
 
In this case, the conditional variance of inflation depends solely on impulse 
uncertainty. Equations (6) and (7) capture the updating of the conditional distribution 
of  t+1 β over time in response to new information about realised inflation. As indicated 
by Equation (6), inflation innovations, defined as εt+1  in Equation (4), are used to 
update the estimates of  t+1 β . These estimates are then used to forecast future inflation. 
If there are no inflation shocks and parameter shocks, so that  1 ... tt t k π ππ + − = ==  for 
all t, we can calculate the steady-state rate of inflation, 
*
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and u* is the steady-state unemployment rate, computed as the sample mean.  
 
The conditional variance of steady-state inflation is then given by: 
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β                              (11) 
 
is a (k + m + 1 x 1) vector.            
 
Having obtained uncertainty measures for each country, it is possible to analyse the 
link between inflation uncertainty and the level of inflation. In particular, we estimate 
a bivariate VAR model of inflation and steady-state inflation uncertainty, since the 
ECB focuses on long-run price stability. The model also includes a dummy variable to 
allow for possible structural breaks in the underlying relationship reflecting the 
introduction of the euro.  
 




































1                       (11) 
 
where unct+1 represents steady-state uncertainty (i.e. 
2*
1 () tt σπ + ), Dt is an intercept shift 
dummy variable, A(L) a matrix polynomial and B a 2×1 matrix. In the model 
specified above, the break date is imposed exogenously to coincide with the 
introduction of the euro in December 1998.  
 
Subsequently, we carry out Granger-causality tests and also apply a sequential 
dummy approach to detect possible breaks endogenously. The motivation for the 
latter type of analysis comes from the literature arguing that rational agents are likely 
to react to the announcement of a regime switch before its implementation, and 
therefore breaks in the relationship of interest could have occurred before January 
1999 (see Wilfling, 2004, and Wilfling and Maennig, 2001) .   6
 
3. Empirical  Analysis 
 
3.1 Data Description  
 
Our preferred measure of inflation is the monthly rate of change of the seasonally 
unadjusted Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the Eurozone as a 
whole.
1 The sample period is 1980:m1 – 2009:m2. Chart 1 below plots this series 
from 1990 onwards together with the corresponding year-on-year growth rate. Visual 
inspection suggests declining inflation and relatively subdued variability in the run-up 
to EMU and stable inflation afterwards with increased variability, particularly so 
towards the end of the sample.   
 
Chart 1. EMU Inflation 









Chart 2 shows the seasonally unadjusted monthly unemployment rate. The series 
exhibits a cyclical pattern and is clearly linked to output developments over the same 
period. Finally Chart 3 contains the scatter plot of inflation against the unemployment 
rate. Consistently with the expectations-augmented Phillips curve framework (Phelps, 
1967, and Friedman, 1968), it suggests that there is an inverse relationship between 
inflation and the unemployment rate and that a downward shift might have occurred 
at the start of EMU. Further, the curve appears to be flatter in the euro years.
 2  
                                                 
1 “Euro area (changing composition) - HICP - Overall index, Monthly Index, Eurostat, neither 
seasonally nor working day adjusted”. Eurostat code: VAL.IDX05.EMU.00. This series is available 
from January 1990, and has been extended backwards using a weighted average of the growth rates of 
the corresponding national series for France, Germany, Italy and Spain.  
2 “Euro area (changing composition) - Standardised unemployment rate, Total (all ages), Total (male & 
female), Eurostat, neither seasonally or working day adjusted, percentage of civilian workforce”. The 
series is available from January 1993, with Eurostat code:   7
 
This might reflect declining inflation expectations in response to the adoption of a 
single monetary policy pursuing long-term price stability, as specified in the 
Maastricht Treaty. As the Bundesbank (2009) points out, all surveys for medium- to 
long-term inflation expectations in the euro area have indicated a rate just under 2% 
since the euro was launched in January 1999. This suggests that the Eurosystem was 
successful in creating and maintaining credibility, convincing individuals and 
enterprises that resolute action in terms of interest rates would be taken in the 
presence of serious inflationary risks.  
 
 
Chart 2. EMU Unemployment rate 













                                                                                                                                            
VAL.EZ.CURRENT.UNEM.TOT.M_PC_UNEM_TOT.NSA. It is linked backwards until February 
1982 with the series “EU12 including West Germany - Standardised unemployment rate, Total (all 
ages), Total (male & female), Eurostat, neither seasonally nor working day adjusted, percentage of 
civilian workforce”, Eurostat code: VAL.UNER.T.A0_99.ORIGINAL.EC_85.M. The two remaining 
years are completed by using the yearly growth rate of the series “Euro area - UNEMPLOYMENT, 
STANDARDISED (EU/ILO DEFINITION)(MU16) SA”, from the BIS database: Macro-economic 
series (Blocks A-K, Q-W). 
   8
Chart 3. Inflation-unemployment cross-plot 




































3.2 Trend Inflation, Steady-State Inflation and Inflation Persistence  
 
Our benchmark univariate model of the inflation process regresses current inflation on 
a constant term and three lags of both inflation and the unemployment rate. A 
Bayesian approach is taken for the estimation. We start from an appropriate but 
weakly informative prior, and use the 1980s as a pre-sample to update it. We report 
the results from 1990m1 onwards, therefore including the period immediately before 
the Maastricht Treaty, the convergence period to meet the requirements of the Treaty, 
and the first decade of EMU. After the estimation, and in order to check whether there 
is time variation in the relevant parameters of the models, we perform ADF tests on 
trend inflation, inflation persistence and the sum of the coefficients of unemployment.  
 
Table 1. Tests for time variation 
Coefficients of AR component 
Constant Sum(πt-1, πt-2, πt-3) Sum(ut-1, ut-2, ut-3) 
ADF test (p-value) -2.072 (0.256) -1.558  (0.503) -2.528  (0.110) 
Coefficients of GARCH component 
haλ 
Parameter values 0.0005 0.0796 0.9161 
T-stats based on 
covariance matrix
1.36 3.42* 37.98** 
Squared standardized residuals serial correlation 
LB(1) LB(2) LB(3) LB(4) 
2.59 5.69 6.95 7.06 
   9
In all cases we conclude that there is time variation, either in the form of non- 
stationarity or in the form of structural breaks, which justifies the use of time-varying 
parameters in the AR equation. Similarly, we test for the significance of the ARCH 
and GARCH parameters of the model, finding that they are both significant. We 
report in Table 1 the Ljung-Box test statistic for serial correlation of the residuals at 
lags 1 to 4, showing that there is no residual autocorrelation at 5% level.  
 
Charts 4-9 are based on the estimation results. Chart 4 shows trend inflation, namely 
the estimated time-varying constant from Equation (4), which declines steadily from 
the beginning of the 1990s up to the start of EMU, stabilising afterwards. The 
estimates of the individual coefficients on lagged unemployment (not reported) are 
not particularly informative, but it is clear that their sum, shown in Chart 5, is 
negative throughout the sample. This is consistent with our earlier interpretation of 
the data based on the Phillips curve model. It suggests again that this curve has 
become flatter since the introduction of the euro, possibly reflecting a more firm 
anchoring of inflation expectations. 
 
Chart 4. EMU Trend inflation (month on month) 











Chart 6 plots inflation persistence, defined as the sum of its autoregressive 
coefficients. This exhibits a positive trend becoming negative at the beginning of the 
third Phase of EMU, which may reflect lower and better-anchored inflation 
expectations in the post-1999 period, consistently with the ECB’s mandate of 
achieving long-term price stability and with theory. For instance, Erceg and Levin 
(2003) show that inflation displays very little persistence if the long-run inflation 
target is constant. Similarly, Orphanides and Williams (2005) demonstrate that if 
long-run inflation expectations are well anchored, then inflation will be less persistent 
than if the public is uncertain about the long-run inflation target. 
   10
Chart 5. Total impact of unemployment on inflation 











Chart 6. Inflation persistence 
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Chart 7 plots steady-state inflation as defined by Equation (8). It shows a gradual but 
marked decline for most of the sample period. From 1999, whilst the downward trend 
gradually flattens out, volatility appears to increase, especially in the early stages of 
EMU and in the most recent period. 
 
Chart 7. Steady state inflation 










3.3 Short-Run and Steady-State Inflation Uncertainty 
 
Chart 8 shows short-run inflation uncertainty and its structural component estimated 
using Equation (5). A sharp decline in the early part of the sample is followed by an 
upward shift and higher volatility around a positive trend afterwards, the biggest spike 
coinciding with the latest financial turmoil. Decomposing short-run uncertainty into 
impulse and structural uncertainty reveals that the latter dominates, i.e. exogenous 
shocks are the main driving force of swings in short-run uncertainty, whilst structural 
uncertainty (which can be interpreted as reflecting unanticipated changes in monetary 
policy) is relatively stable throughout the sample period and does not play a 
significant role.  
 
The focus of the ECB is, however, on medium- to long-term price stability, and 
therefore a more relevant measure to consider is steady-state inflation uncertainty (see 
Chart 9). This appears to follow a downward trend with the exception of the early 
years of the euro, when agents were still learning about the new monetary 
environment. The steady decline since then can be seen as an indication of the ECB’s 
success in fulfilling its mandate as specified in the Maastricht Treaty.    12
Chart 8. Short-run and structural inflation uncertainty 










Chart 9. Steady-state inflation uncertainty 
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4. The Relationship between Inflation and Steady-State Inflation Uncertainty in 
a Bivariate VAR Framework 
 
Next, we estimate a bivariate VAR for inflation and steady-state inflation uncertainty 
to test for causality and for the presence of structural breaks related to EMU. As a first 
step, the order of integration of the variables needs to be established. Standard ADF 
tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in levels in both cases. We then carry out 
the unit root tests proposed by Saikkonen and Lütkepohl (2002) and Lanne et al. 
(2002). These are based on first estimating the deterministic term by a generalized 
least squares (GLS) procedure under the unit root null hypothesis and subtracting it 
from the original series. Then an ADF-type test is performed on the adjusted series 
which also includes terms to correct for estimation errors in the parameters of the 
deterministic part. As in the case of the ADF statistic, the asymptotic null distribution 
is non-standard. Critical values are tabulated in Lanne et al. (2002). The test results 
when allowing for exogenous breaks indicate that steady-state uncertainty might not 
be stationary, but those including endogenously determined breaks again support 
stationarity of both series (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Unit root tests on inflation and steady-state inflation uncertainty 
   INFLATION  SS_UNC 
Test  Lag  Test statistic  Det. Comp.  Test statistic  Det. Comp.
3  -6.80 **  C, T, SD  -4.45 **  C, T, SD   
ADF  REC  -3.50 * (5)  C, T, SD  -4.45 ** (3)  C, T, SD 
3 -5.14**  C,  T,  SD 
1998 M12 




EXO_SB  REC  -3.03 * (5)  C, T, SD 
1998 M12 
-1.58 (5)  C, T, SD 
1998 M12 
3  -8.14 **  C, T, SD 
2008 M5 




END_SB  REC  -1.52 (11)  C, T, SD 
2008 M7 
-3.58 **  (3)  C, T, SD 
2001 M3 
 
Table 3. Johansen Trace Test for:  [infl, infl_ss_var] 
Test 1: included lags (levels):   3, trend and intercept, seasonal dummies included 
Coint_rank    Test stat.  p_val  90%  95%  99% 
r0 = 0  91.11   0 .0000  23.32  25.73  30.67 
r0 = 1  19.71  0.0020  10.68  12.45  16.22 
Test 2: included lags (levels):   1, trend and intercept, seasonal dummies included 
r0 = 0  137.26  0.0000  23.32  25.73  30.67 
r1 = 1  21.37  0.0009  10.68  12.45  16.22 
Test 3: included lags (levels):   8, trend and intercept, seasonal dummies included 
r0 = 0  67.20  0.0000  23.32  25.73  30.67 
r1 = 1  16.20  0.0101  10.68  12.45  16.22 
   14
Johansen’s cointegration tests confirm that both inflation and inflation uncertainty can 
be treated as stationary in levels (see Table 3). Therefore the remainder of the analysis 
is carried out under this assumption, and a VAR in levels was estimated. 
 
Standard selection criteria suggested choosing lag length 14 for the bivariate VAR in 
levels. The deterministic component was specified to include a constant and a trend, 
as well as seasonal dummies and a shift dummy in 1998m12 to capture the 
introduction of the euro.  Standard diagnostic tests indicate that the model is 
statistically adequate. Granger-causality tests imply uni-directional causality running 
from steady-state inflation uncertainty to inflation at the 5% confidence level, 
consistently with the Cukierman-Meltzer model, and bi-directional causality at the 
10% level (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Test for Granger-causality, dummy 1998m12 
H0: “infl_ss_var” does not Granger-cause “infl” – whole sample 
Test statistic l = 1.8757  pval-F( l; 14, 342) = 0.0279 
H0: “infl” does not Granger-cause “infl_ss_var” – whole sample 
Test statistic l = 1.6509  pval-F( l; 14, 342) = 0.0644 
 
The model was also estimated including a sequential intercept shift dummy in order to 
test endogenously for possible structural breaks. Chart 10 shows the sequential t-value 
of the corresponding coefficient in the equation for steady-state inflation uncertainty. 
As can be seen, a sizeable downward shift is apparent at the end of 2000. This is 
consistent with the earlier finding of declining and more stable steady-state inflation 
uncertainty in the euro years.  
 
Chart 10. Sequential t-value of the dummy coefficient 
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The results of full-sample Granger-causality tests using the specification including a 
shift dummy for the break detected in 2000m1 are consistent with the earlier ones. 
However, when carried out separately over the two sub-samples 1990m1-1998m6 and 
2001m3-200m2, such tests provide evidence of a reversal in causality, implying that 
the Cukierman-Meltzer link has been replaced by the Friedman-Ball one in the second 
subsample (see Table 5), and that the ECB can effectively reduce inflation uncertainty 
by bringing down the inflation rate. 
 
Table 5. Test for Granger-causality, p – values 




Inflation does not Granger-
cause inflation variability 
0.03 0.06 0.09 
Inflation variability does not 
Granger-cause inflation  
0.41 0.17 0.17 
 
 
5.  Conclusions  
 
This paper estimates a time-varying AR-GARCH model of inflation for the euro area, 
and investigates its linkages with the resulting measures of inflation uncertainty in a 
bivariate VAR framework, also modelling the possible structural break resulting from 
the creation of EMU at the beginning of 1999. Obtaining accurate measures of 
inflation uncertainty is crucial for monetary authorities, since higher uncertainty 
requires more active policies, as pointed out by Soderstrom (2002). Our main findings 
are as follows. Steady-state inflation and inflation uncertainty have both declined 
steadily since the inception of EMU, whilst short-run uncertainty has increased, but 
mainly owing to exogenous shocks.  A sequential dummy procedure provides further 
evidence of a break coinciding with the introduction of the euro and leading to lower 
long-run uncertainty.  
 
Interestingly, our analysis suggests that a tough anti-inflation stance successfully 
reduces long-run uncertainty in the case of the Eurozone, whilst the opposite holds for 
the US, where tighter policies adopted by the Fed seem to lead to lower predictability 
(see Benati and Surico, 2008 and Cogley et al., 2009). This might reflect differences 
in the mandate of the two central banks. Whilst the ECB is responsible for price 
stability only, the Fed pursues both price stability and full employment, two goals 
which at times can be in conflict. Moreover, whilst the ECB adopts a clear 
quantitative definition of price stability, no such definition is available in the case of 
the Fed. 
 
It also appears that the direction of causality has been reversed, and that in the euro 
period the Friedman-Ball link is empirically supported, implying that the ECB can 
achieve lower inflation uncertainty by lowering the inflation rate. This is consistent 
with Fountas et al. (2004) and Conrad and Karanasos (2005) and with the idea that, 
given the ECB’s mandate and its record so far, any long-lasting deviations from price 
stability in the Eurozone would surprise market participants and lead to higher 
inflation uncertainty.    16
  
Overall, these results give support to the view expressed by the President of the ECB, 
Jean-Claude Trichet, a few years ago, when he argued that the single monetary policy 
and its clear focus on long-run price stability had helped anchor medium- to long-run 
inflation expectations in the Euro area, thus reducing inflation uncertainty (Trichet 
2004). Short-run inflation uncertainty might have risen since 1999, but this does not 
appear to reflect higher structural uncertainty associated with unanticipated monetary 
policy changes, but possibly remaining differences across member states, fiscal 
policy, and financial and commodity market price shocks.   
This analysis can be extended in several directions. First, the regression model for the 
inflation process can be expanded to include other possible determinants such as 
industrial production, money growth, the yield curve, the exchange rate and credit. 
Second, whether the observed patterns can indeed be attributed to the role played by 
the ECB can be tested by comparing our findings with those obtained for a control 
group of countries, such as other European countries outside the Eurozone, the US, 
and Canada. Third, estimation of a time-varying VAR-GARCH model could be 
carried out instead of treating unemployment and other possible variables as 
exogenous. Fourth, the forecasting properties of the model could be investigated.    17
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